Introduction
The evolving jurisprudence on disability rights in India continues to expose the tension between formal administrative processes and substantive equality. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Sudhanshu Kardam v. Comptroller and Auditor General of India (2026)[1] presents a compelling instance of this tension. The case traverses through the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), the Delhi High Court, and ultimately the Supreme Court, raising critical questions regarding the interpretation of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act), particularly in the context of public employment
Factual Matrix
The petitioner, a candidate with Specific Learning Disability (SLD), was successfully selected through the SSC Combined Graduate Level Examination 2018 for the post of Assistant Audit Officer (AAO), a Group ‘B’ position.
At the time of the advertisement, candidates with disabilities such as SLD and mental illness were expressly permitted to apply. However, this permission came with a condition, their selection would depend on whether the posts were identified as suitable for their disability category.
Crucially, while candidates were allowed to participate in the entire selection process, they were never informed of the outcome of this identification exercise. It was only in 2021, nearly three years after the advertisement that their dossiers were returned on the ground that the post had not been identified as suitable.
This sequence of events raises serious concerns about fairness and transparency. Candidates were effectively assessed under a shifting standard, where eligibility was clarified only after the process had concluded.
The CAT’S Approach: Focus on Rights and Inclusion
The CAT adopted a balanced and rights-oriented approach. It recognised that the denial of appointment, after successful selection, could not be justified merely on the basis of an internal classification.Importantly, the Tribunal relied on the government notification dated 4 January 2021, which identified relevant posts as suitable for persons with benchmark disabilities.
The CAT’s reasoning implicitly recognised that administrative processes must align with statutory mandates, and that candidates cannot be unfairly excluded after being allowed to compete on equal terms.
The High Court’s Formalism: Defence to Administrative Determination
The Delhi High Court set aside the CAT’s decision and upheld the rejection of the candidates. Its reasoning, however, raises several concerns.
One of the most striking aspects of the judgment is that the Court faulted the petitioner for not challenging the advertisement at an earlier stage. This finding appears misplaced. The advertisement itself did not bar candidates with SLD or mental illness from applying. On the contrary, it expressly permitted them to participate, subject only to identification of posts.
In such a situation, there was no clear cause of action at the time of the advertisement. The grievance arose only later, when the petitioner’s candidature was rejected without prior notice of the identification outcome.
Further, the High Court did not adequately consider the failure of the CAG to inform candidates about the results of the identification exercise. This omission is significant. If the administration had already determined that certain posts were unsuitable, it had a duty to disclose this information at the outset. By withholding it, the authorities allowed candidates to proceed under a mistaken belief.
The High Court also gave considerable weight to the internal identification exercise conducted by the CAG, without closely examining its legality or procedural fairness. This reflects a broader tendency to defer to administrative decisions, even when they have serious implications for individual rights.
Overall, the High Court’s approach appears formal and restrictive, placing the burden on the candidate rather than scrutinising administrative conduct.
The Supreme Court’s Pragmatic Turn: Relied without Doctrinal clarity
In contrast, the Supreme Court’s order reflects a problem-solving approach rather than a strictly doctrinal one. Instead of directly adjudicating on the legality of exclusion, the Court focused on ensuring that the affected candidates were accommodated in suitable posts. By directing the SSC to forward dossiers and permitting the creation of supernumerary posts, the Court ensured immediate relief. It also implicitly acknowledged the relevance of the 2021 notification, noting that there was “no impediment whatsoever” to accommodating such candidates in identified posts.
Critical Evaluation
While the Supreme Court’s decision is fair in outcome, it leaves some important legal questions unanswered. The Supreme Court sidestepped key legal questions, including:
First, the Court did not examine whether it is legally permissible to identify posts as suitable or unsuitable after the recruitment advertisement has been issued. This issue lies at the heart of the dispute. If eligibility conditions can be modified after candidates have applied, it undermines the fairness of the entire process.
Second, the Court did not engage with Note 4 of the 4 January 2021 notification, which suggests that once a post is identified in the feeder grade, corresponding promotional posts should also be treated as identified. This could have supported the petitioner’s claim to the AAO post, rather than a lower Group ‘C’ position.
Third, while the Court accommodated the petitioner in an alternative post, it did not consider granting notional seniority or other consequential benefits, despite the delay being attributable to administrative action. This limits the completeness of the relief.
Most importantly, the Court appears to have approached the case as one of balancing equities, rather than deciding it strictly within the framework of the law. The petitioner had a strong case based on statutory provisions and procedural fairness. A more detailed legal analysis could have provided clearer guidance for future cases. This makes the judgment practical but not strongly precedential.
In contrast, the CAT’s decision, though set aside, appears more aligned with the purpose of the RPwD Act. It focused on inclusion, individual capability, and the need to remove barriers rather than impose blanket exclusions.
Conclusion
Sudhanshu Kardam underscores the persistent gap between the promise of disability rights and their implementation in public employment. While the Supreme Court’s intervention provides immediate relief, its reluctance to engage with foundational legal issues reflects a missed opportunity to strengthen disability jurisprudence.
The case ultimately highlights a critical lesson: substantive equality requires more than administrative accommodation, it demands judicial clarity, statutory fidelity, and a firm commitment to inclusion.
Shreya Gupta
5th year, B.B.A LL.B (Hon), BML Munjal University School of Law.
[1] 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 237