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An Analysis of N. Biju v. State of Kerala & Ors.: When the clash is amongst persons with disabilities themselves

Sometimes, the conflict in disability rights is not between persons with and without disabilities, but within different groups of persons with disabilities themselves. The Kerala High Court’s judgment dated 27.08.2025 in N. Biju v. State of Kerala present case illustrates this tension vividly.

Facts

By Government Orders, persons with disabilities were permitted to operate coffee vending shops within government institutions and medical colleges for a period of 1 year. The petitioners, all persons with disabilities, had been granted such licenses at the Medical College Hospital, Vandanam. On the expiry of the 1-year period, they were directed to vacate the space licensed to them. They argued that they had invested substantial sums and should not be displaced merely because the government decided to auction stalls afresh. Their plea was that such eviction without a permanent scheme violated the protective ethos of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 which was the governing statute for the applicable period.

Arguments

  • Petitioners’ side:
    • The State has a duty under the 1995 Act to rehabilitate and provide sustainable livelihoods, not to pitch one group of disabled persons against another.
    • Restricting licenses to one or two years through auctions undermined their legitimate expectation, especially after they had borrowed money to set up shops.
    • They invoked principles of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation and cited Supreme Court judgments on the need to preserve the dignity of those with disabilities.
  • Respondents’ side:
    • No perpetual right accrued to the appellants; licenses were always time-bound.
    • Pursuant to earlier court directions, the government had revised policy to ensure that all persons with disabilities had opportunities. One-third of stalls in medical colleges were now reserved for PwDs, allotted through limited-period auctions restricted to PwDs.
    • Public interest demanded equitable distribution rather than permanent monopolization by a few individuals

Judgment

The Division Bench upheld the Single Judge’s 2016 decision, holding that state largesse for PwDs cannot be confined to a select few. Equitable distribution requires that petitioners make way for others in the class. The court stressed that benefits under the 1995 Act are conferred on the category of persons with disabilities as a whole, not on specific individuals. Petitioners were free to compete in fresh auctions, but no vested right to permanent occupation existed

Three Comments

  1. On reading the judgment, one is reminded of the judgment of Dr. S. Muralidhar, sitting singly, in Lalit v. GNCTD . This concerned grant of hostel accommodation to blind students where the rights of two groups of students were pitted against each other. The Court held that the older students must give way to the younger students.
  2. Delay in disposal: The Single Judge’s verdict dates back to 21.11.2016. It is disquieting that the Division Bench took more than eight years to pronounce its judgment in a case concerning disability rights and livelihood. Justice delayed, here, risks being justice denied.
  3. Applicability of the 2016 Act: Since the cause of action arose under the 1995 Act, reliance on it was legally proper. Yet, by 2025, the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 had long been in force. The court could have at least noted its existence, clarified its inapplicability, and signaled how the newer statute’s broader affirmative action framework might influence future disputes.

Rahul Bajaj

Co-Founder of Mission Accessibility, A Rhodes Scholar with two Master’s degrees in Law from the University of Oxford