The Bombay High Court on Reservation for Totally Blind Candidates A Critical Examination – Harshad Govind Jadhav and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. and Satyashodh and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.
On 22 August 2025, the Bombay High Court delivered its judgment in two connected public interest litigations Harshad Govind Jadhav and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (PIL No. 225 of 2009) and Satyashodh and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (PIL No. 75 of 2006). The petitions, decided by a Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Alok Aradhe and Justice Sandeep V. Marne, raised an important issue concerning the implementation of reservation for persons with disabilities, particularly those with total blindness.
The judgment highlights a crucial gap in policy implementation although reservation exists for “blindness and low vision” as a combined category, in practice, it is overwhelmingly filled by candidates with low vision, leaving totally blind persons excluded from public employment.
Legislative Framework
The issue arose under the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (the “1995 Act”), which at the relevant time provided for 1% reservation in employment for persons with “blindness or low vision”. This framework was later continued under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (the “2016 Act”), specifically under Section 34, which mandates that not less than 4% of vacancies in government establishments be reserved for persons with benchmark disabilities. Of this, 1% is earmarked for persons with blindness and low vision.
The statutory scheme thus treats blindness and low vision as a single class of disability for the purpose of reservation.
Petitioners’ Contentions
The petitioners contended that the combined categorisation had the unintended consequence of depriving totally blind candidates of any meaningful opportunity in public service. Since employers tend to prefer candidates with residual vision, the entire quota under Section 34(1)(a) was effectively consumed by low vision candidates.
The petitioners submitted that this structural imbalance called for a remedy in the form of further sub-classification, whereby 50% of the posts reserved under the blindness quota should be earmarked exclusively for totally blind persons. They also pointed to the Government Resolution (GR) dated 18 June 2007, which recognised the need to prioritise candidates with higher degrees of disability. However, they argued that the said GR was not being effectively implemented.
Additional grievances were raised concerning the methodology for identifying posts suitable for blind candidates, medical disqualifications and the absence of uniformity in disability thresholds.
Respondents’ Position
The State of Maharashtra, through the Additional Government Pleader, resisted the plea for sub-classification. It was argued that the statutory text of Section 34 of the 2016 Act does not permit any further division within categories. Just as “deaf and hard of hearing” or “locomotor disability” are treated as composite categories so too are “blindness and low vision”. The State also submitted that the identification of posts is carried out in accordance with guidelines issued by the Central Government, and that further judicial intervention to carve out sub-quotas would amount to judicial legislation.
The Court’s Findings
The Court’s analysis turned on the interpretation of Section 34(1)(a). It held that the statutory framework does not contemplate internal sub-classification within benchmark disabilities. Therefore, the prayer for allocating 0.5% reservation exclusively for totally blind candidates could not be granted, as such an order would “cause violence” to the text of the provision.
Nevertheless, the Court acknowledged the ground reality that totally blind candidates were being excluded. Affidavits placed on record revealed that appointments under the “blindness and low vision” quota were almost entirely secured by low vision candidates, while totally blind candidates remained underrepresented. Recognising this inequity, the Court drew attention to the GR dated 18 June 2007, which envisaged giving priority to candidates with higher degrees of disability, thereby indirectly favouring totally blind candidates. However, the Court noted that the subsequent GRs issued in 2023 and 2025 while dealing with promotions and recruitment procedures failed to specifically address the participation of totally blind candidates.
Directions Issued
Balancing statutory constraints with constitutional principles of equality, the Court issued the following operative directions:
- The State Government shall take necessary steps to ensure better participation of totally blind candidates in public employment, particularly by addressing their inability to compete with low vision candidates.
- The Government shall consider identification of certain categories of posts exclusively for totally blind candidates.
- These measures are to be undertaken within a period of four months.
The petitions were accordingly disposed of.
Significance of the Judgment
This judgment underscores the tension between statutory interpretation and substantive equality. While the Court correctly refrained from re-drafting Section 34, it did not ignore the social injustice arising from the practical exclusion of totally blind candidates. By directing the State to take remedial steps through administrative measures, the Court struck a balance between judicial restraint and proactive protection of rights.
The case highlights the limitations of blanket categorisation in disability law. While grouping blindness and low vision into a single class may appear administratively convenient, it overlooks the vastly different realities of individuals within that category.
Conclusion
The Bombay High Court’s decision is a reminder that formal equality does not always guarantee substantive equality. Totally blind candidates, though legally covered under the same reservation as low vision candidates, are disadvantaged in practice. By urging the State to take affirmative steps, including the possibility of reserving posts exclusively for totally blind candidates, the court has attempted to realign policy with the constitutional vision of equality and dignity.
The judgment may not have altered the text of Section 34, but it opens the door for policy innovation. It now falls upon the State Government and potentially the legislature to ensure that the promise of inclusion under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act translates into meaningful opportunities for the totally blind.
Ushas Reddy
5th year B.B.A.LL.B (Honours) student at BML Munjal University School of Law.